

# **SAP Security Group Deutschland**


Xiting Kunden-Event mit Partnern

9./10. N/AII 2023

## SAP2SIEM - Wissen was passiert

Erfahrungsbericht der Allianz Technology über die Herausforderungen bei der Implementierung einer SIEM-Schnittstelle

Bernhard Schulze (Allianz Technology) & Andre Tenbuß (Xiting GmbH)



#### **AGENDA**

- 1. Introduction Allianz Technology and Xiting
- 2. Xiting SIEM-Connector Fundamentals
- 3. SIEM Requirements (why?)
- 4. AZ Tech System Landscape (for whom?)
- 5. Target Architecture (how?)
- 6. Security Issues (what?)







Allianz Technology at a glance

Facts from 2023

of Allianz' total IT spend with Allianz Technology

Presence in

globe

51 countries around the

814 services offered as

9


simple product clusters

59%

of Allianz IT budget spent on target IT solutions

# Our global presence

The Allianz Technology global footprint enables efficient service delivery worldwide and close interaction with OE business partners.





## **Challenges**

## **Central Compliance Monitoring**



#### **Central landscape monitoring**

The focus is on the central monitoring of safety-relevant settings and compliance with the defined processes





Focusses on immediate transfer of logs to connected SIEM system





## Overview and Drilldown Perspective

Extensive monitoring and auditing options as well as overview and detail perspectives




Complex Rule-based detection of suspicious activities in your SAP system through intelligent evaluation of log information






## **Principle**





## **Architecture**





#### **Standard Use Cases**

#### Authorizations

Assignment of critical roles

## System configuration

Changes to security-relevant system settings

#### Data leak

View or extract data from confidential databases

#### Critical resources

Calling prohibited transactions, programs and function modules

#### Debugging


Debugging in productive systems including changing variables

#### Log settings


Changing or deactivating SAP logs in order to conceal critical processes

#### SAP standard user

Unauthorized use of SAP standard users




## **AZ Tech SAP Security Essentials**



Run Allianz Technology SAP systems compliant and secure





## **AZ Tech SAP System Landscape**

Number of SAP systems
Number of clients
Supported SAP Netweaver Releases
SAP Service Owners

~ 90 (ABAP and Java stack)

- ~ 220
- 7.00 to 7.57
- ~ 20; multiple customers per Service Owner
- On-Premises and Cloud (laaS and SaaS)



#### Challenges

- One security solution for multiple SAP releases
- Huge number of SAP systems and SAP clients
- Multiple customers with local deviations and technical restraints

Locations

- "Hidden" security critical workarounds
- High number of false-positive alerts



#### The road to success:


- Standards
- Automation
- Deviation Handling
- Central Tool (information at your fingertips)


One SAP Security Standard for all






## **AZ Tech SAP Security Essentials**






## **Search Patterns - General**



(1) This may require the adaptation of existing processes

#### **Avoid False Positive Alerts**



Procedures are in place to temporarily suppress alerts for approved activities



#### **Zero False Positive Tickets**


#### General Issues

- Reestablish security settings after a maintenance
- Activate and deactivate maintenance mode
- Maintain deviations:
  - Some deviations are permitted under certain conditions
  - If an issues can't be fixed promptly, use a temporary mitigation
  - Not all issues can be fixed →long-term mitigation (requiring an audit proof reason)

Set up processes to avoid false positive tickets



## **Incident Process – Workflow**



## **Challenges (Tool independent)**

Challenge	Problem	Recommended Solution	
Technical			
<ul> <li>One security solution for multiple SAP releases</li> <li>High number of SAP systems and SAP clients</li> <li>Secure Run of the SIEM interface</li> <li>Why not only use the XAMS SA Maintenance Mode?</li> <li>Stable Run of the SIEM interface (sort out problems with RFC connections; system which do not answer may block the collection process)</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Full functions not for all systems</li> <li>Maintenance and Completeness</li> <li>Monitoring gaps</li> <li>Log based events detected in SIEM are not blocked</li> <li>Network problems may block collecting process; data loss</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Manual checks, SIEM alert suppression</li> <li>Central tool, checks (also completeness) and deployment</li> <li>Selected solution must support secure run</li> <li>Processes to temporary suppress only affected alerts</li> <li>Automated monitoring and restart of the SAPS2SIEM solution</li> </ul>	
Alerts			
<ul> <li>What shall we do with all the collected data?</li> <li>Who cares about the SIEM hits?</li> <li>Who cares about the Security Incidents created by SIEM?</li> <li>High number of false-positive alerts at the beginning</li> <li>Condition based alerts (e.g., parameter setting)</li> <li>Activation of changed security settings (restart)</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Data grave, miss threads and alerts</li> <li>Miss alerts, initiator is processor</li> <li>Nobody feels responsible, 7x24</li> <li>Miss threads, huge number of tickets</li> <li>Recurring alarms in high numbers</li> <li>It can take a long time to fix issues</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Security awareness, talk with service owner</li> <li>Clean-up: Initiator; stay-clean: security team</li> <li>Security awareness, central security team</li> <li>Clean-up, start with limited search patterns</li> <li>Involve stakeholder early, define and implement mandatory standards, mitigations</li> <li>Quarantine on basis of criticality</li> <li>Temporary suppress affected alerts</li> <li>Transparence</li> </ul>	

## **Challenges (Tool independent)**

Challenge	Problem	Recommended Solution
Security awareness		
<ul> <li>"Hidden" security critical workarounds</li> <li>Tension between ISO and local SAP service owners</li> <li>Multiple customers with local deviations and technical restraints</li> <li>Multiple local SAP Service Owners (responsible)</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Security breach, false-positive alerts</li> <li>Different "beliefs" about security</li> <li>Security awareness</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>ISO support, mandatory standards, redesign</li> <li>The ISO is sometimes your friend</li> </ul>

Connecting to SIEM doesn't finish the job; just wait until something happens is not an option; you must take care about the logs and events



#### ...last words

A secure infrastructure can only be physically achieved together with all stakeholders.

Without a general security awareness, you are lost.

Standards and automation are the key to success.

The simpler the solution, the more time you have to focus on the security of your systems.




## **Outlook & Integration of new Functions**

- Reducing False Positive on SIEM side:
  - Rule engine with best practice templates for patterns (definition of critical events)
- Monitoring of Cloud Application:
  - SAP BTP integration and log & event monitoring of cloud applications
- Optimizing Data Load:
  - Detailed analysis and filtering of logs for efficient and resource-saving monitoring



#### FRAGEN UND DISKUSSIONEN





## **Ansprechpartner**



Andre Tenbuß

SAP Security Consultant

Xiting GmbH



Bernhard Schulze
SAP Technology CCoE
Allianz Technology



Wir sollten uns unterhalten

Sprechen Sie mit uns über Ihre Fragen und Anforderungen



#### Individuelle Demo

Vereinbaren Sie einen Termin für eine individuelle Demo mit uns



### **Proof-of-Concept Workshop**

Wir stellen die Funktionalitäten des Werkzeugs in Ihrem SAP System vor



#### **Security Konzept**

Wir liefern Best Practices und entwickeln mit Ihnen ein nachhaltiges Security Konzept